


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26 MARCH 1991



JPRS Report

Soviet Union

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 11 & 12, November & December 1990

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Chronicle of Soviet-American Relations Jul-Sep 1990

914K0013A Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 90 (signed to press 24 Oct 90) pp 124-127

[Text]

July

3—A joint Soviet-American weekly went on sale in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. Presidents G. Bush and M.S. Gorbachev welcomed the issuance of this publication.

5—The activities of the United Nations and other international organizations and transnational issues were discussed during consultations by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State J. Bolton within the framework of Soviet-American dialogue.

8—The U.S. Administration decided to authorize the use of Soviet boosters in the launching of American satellites. Although the Soviet side is providing the rockets and launch engineering personnel for this program, it is not a shareholder in the enterprise.

9—An international exhibit of personal computers and software, "The PC World Forum," organized by the American International Data Group company and the Information Computer Enterprise joint venture in conjunction with the state committees of the USSR for science and technology, television and radio broadcasting, and the press, opened in Moscow at the Exhibition of National Economic Achievements of the USSR.

A group of experts from the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry, the largest delegation of recent years, returned from a trip to the United States, where they toured this country's leading aerospace companies.

10—American artists from San Francisco belonging to the joint Soviet-American "Painting and Ecology" movement were in Leningrad on a return visit.

11—V.F. Petrovskiy received President P. Goldmark of the Rockefeller Foundation.

13—The Pentagon decided to cancel several chemical weapons production and purchase programs in line with the Soviet-American agreement the presidents of the USSR and United States signed in Washington on the elimination of chemical weapons.

14—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Obukhov received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request. During their conversation, J. Matlock delivered a message from J. Baker to E.A. Shevardnadze.

15—The 18th annual conference of the Forum for American-Soviet Dialogue completed its work on the grounds of the military academy of the U.S. Army in West Point. These conferences have been held alternately in the

United States and the USSR since 1972 on the initiative of several American organizations and the Komsomol Central Committee and USSR Committee of Youth Organizations.

17—George Bush and M.S. Gorbachev spoke for almost an hour on the telephone. The President of the United States spoke at length about the meetings of the Western leaders in London and Houston, and the president of the USSR described the results of FRG Chancellor H. Kohl's visit to Moscow.

18—An agreement was signed in Clemson (South Carolina) between the State Committee of the USSR for Public Education and an American university consortium. It envisages the establishment of an institute in the Soviet Union for international business studies. One semester of the 2-year course will be held in Moscow or Leningrad, and the rest will be at one of the American universities belonging to the consortium.

19—A delegation from the American 22d Century Foundation, headed by E. Easton, went to Moscow as the guests of the USSR Social Invention Fund.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov received G. Howes, a State Department division head and the head of the U.S. delegation at the international Open Skies conference.

20—The formal presentation of the first issue of the Russian-language edition of BUSINESS WEEK, the magazine of the American business community, took place in New York. The issuance of this publication was the result of joint action by the McGraw-Hill Company and the Kniga Publishing House.

23—Chairman N.I. Ryzhkov of the USSR Council of Ministers received members of an American delegation from the National Coalition of Vietnam Veterans, headed by its president, Thomas Birch, U.S. superior court justice, when they were in the Soviet Union.

They discussed ways of assisting in the release of prisoners-of-war, particularly the Soviet soldiers who were taken prisoner by the Afghan opposition.

23-25—A conference of top-level administrators was held at Washington State University as part of the Goodwill Games civilian exchange program. More than 40 prominent politicians and public spokesmen from the USSR and the United States discussed the problems of conversion, environmental protection, and trade and economic cooperation.

24-25—The 17th Soviet-American Dartmouth Conference was held in Leningrad.

25—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister E.Ye. Obminskiy received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock.

The USSR Bolshoi Ballet tour began with a premier performance of "Ivan the Terrible" in Washington. The ballet company will be touring the United States as part

of the agreement on cultural contacts the USSR and U.S. governments signed at the 1985 Geneva summit meeting.

26—E.A. Shevardnadze was awarded the American Peace Prize of the Ralph Bunche Institute. The prize is awarded each year by two professional associations of jurists from Washington State and bears the name of the famous American diplomat.

29—President N. Swanson of the U.S. Center for International Cooperation was invited to Moscow by the USSR Union of Jurists to attend talks on the organization of a Soviet-American conference on law and economic cooperation.

31—A detachment of naval ships from the Pacific Fleet sailed into the Port of San Diego, the main U.S. naval base on the west coast of North America.

August

1-2—E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker had a working meeting in Irkutsk. They discussed the possibilities for interaction in settling internal Afghan and Cambodian problems, the situation on the Korean peninsula, and the state of Indian-Pakistani relations. They also discussed problems in other regions: the Middle East, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Central America. They exchanged views on German unification, the preparations for the summit meeting of the CSCE countries in Paris, arms reduction and limitation, the Vienna talks, the convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, and other issues. The sides agreed it would be wise to hold regular consultations on the military-political aspects of the situation in Asia.

2—New regular Aeroflot flights between Leningrad and New York began. The first direct flight along the new route was made by a wide-body IL-86 passenger plane.

3—J. Baker arrived in Moscow for urgent consultations with E.A. Shevardnadze in connection with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops. At the end of the meeting, which was held right in the Vnukovo Airport, the heads of the foreign policy departments of the two countries issued a joint statement at a press conference, requesting the international community to stop all deliveries of weapons to Iraq and to take all possible steps for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990.

5—At the request of the American Museum of Military History in Cedarburg (Wisconsin), in 1991 it will receive a T-34 tank as a gift from the president of the USSR and the Soviet people, as well as a World War II Soviet tank officer's uniform and a replica of the USSR State Flag.

7—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister A.M. Belonogov received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request.

14—The restrictions on the number of personnel in Soviet commercial agencies in the United States were lifted. In his announcement on this matter, G. Bush said

that this step was being taken in line with the policy of normalizing relations with the USSR and as a sign of interest in broader business contacts and trade.

The mayors of Los Angeles and Leningrad signed a declaration of fundamentally new relations between the second-largest cities in the United States and USSR. Los Angeles and Leningrad became sister-cities at that moment.

16—Texaco, one of the largest American oil companies, signed an agreement with the USSR Ministry of Geology. By the terms of this agreement, the firm will offer our country comprehensive technical assistance in the exploration, development, and exploitation of oil deposits.

17—The Druzhba, a three-masted training vessel belonging to the Odessa Naval Engineering Academy imeni Leninskiy Komsomol, completed the 6,500-mile trip from Odessa to New York. The members of its Soviet-American crew were cadets from the Odessa and American naval academies.

20—The fourth conference on the effects of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty began in Geneva.

22—At a meeting with specialists from the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenin who were visiting the United States, Chairman Leo Melamed of the Executive Committee of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange said that the exchange was willing to assist the USSR in drawing up a program of transition to a convertible ruble.

September

4-5—In the Kremlin, Chairman A.I. Lukyanov of the USSR Supreme Soviet received a group of U.S. senators, headed by Republic Minority Leader R. Dole, who were in the Soviet Union as the guests of the USSR Supreme Soviet. They discussed the present state and future development of Soviet-American relations during this new phase, distinguished by a move from mutual understanding to interaction and partnership. The senators were also received by M.S. Gorbachev.

7—American Secretary of Commerce R. Mosbacher said he would head a high-level delegation of American businessmen going to Moscow—15 executives of companies producing foods, energy resources, and communication systems.

9—President M.S. Gorbachev of the USSR had a meeting with U.S. President G. Bush in Helsinki. They discussed the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf, other international issues, and different aspects of bilateral relations. At the end of the talks, they approved a joint statement which specifically said: "The only thing that can end the isolation of Iraq is the restoration of Kuwait's status prior to 2 August of this year.

"We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the UN sanctions, and we declare that we will strive,

individually and together, to guarantee the observance of the sanctions in their entirety.

"...We would prefer a peaceful settlement of the crisis and will take a common stance against Iraq's aggression. Moreover, we are fully determined to stop the aggression, and if the steps that are being taken now do not produce this result, we are prepared to consider the possibility of additional steps in line with the UN Charter. We must present the most convincing demonstration that aggression cannot and will not produce advantages."

At the end of the talks, G. Bush and M.S. Gorbachev held a joint press conference.

10—American naval ships arrived in Vladivostok—the cruiser Princeton and the frigate Reuben James. This was the U.S. Navy's response to the visit of the naval detachment of the USSR Pacific Fleet to San Diego a month before, which was called a historic event by the American news media.

American Secretary of State J. Baker arrived in Moscow to attend a meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, United States, Great Britain, the FRG, the GDR, and France (as part of the "two plus four" mechanism) and to conduct Soviet-American negotiations. On 11 September he had a meeting with E.A. Shevardnadze.

11—The JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL NEWS reported that the U.S. National Security Council had authorized Soviet merchant ships to enter the ports of Seattle and Tacoma in Puget Sound on the Pacific coast on the condition of notification 2 weeks in advance.

12—In the presence of President M.S. Gorbachev of the USSR, the foreign ministers of the USSR, United States, Great Britain, the FRG, the GDR, and France signed an agreement in Moscow on the final settlement of the German question, containing decisions on all of the foreign aspects of German unification.

13—M.S. Gorbachev received U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, U.S. Secretary of Commerce R. Mosbacher, and the 15 prominent American businessmen making up the President's trade and economic mission. They are the heads of corporations covering the entire range of American economic affairs. The American delegation was also received by Chairman N.I. Ryzhkov of the USSR Council of Ministers. That same evening the president of the USSR had another meeting with the U.S. secretary of state.

14—A Soviet-American seminar, organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the non-governmental CATO Institute (United States), was held in Moscow. It was attended by economists and political scientists who discussed the transition to a market economy in the USSR and ways of developing relations between the two countries.

15-17—Methods of converting defense production for the manufacture of civilian goods were discussed at a Soviet-American conference in Boston with the motto "Swords into Plowshares." The conference was held on the initiative of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the American Institute of Defense and Disarmament Studies.

15-19—Former President of the United States R. Reagan and his wife were in the USSR as the guests of M.S. Gorbachev.

18—Chairman A.I. Lukyanov of the USSR Supreme Soviet received a group of prominent American jurists in the Kremlin. They were headed by former U.S. Secretary of State W. Rogers and had come to Moscow to attend the Soviet-American conference on "Law and Economic Cooperation," scheduled to begin on 20 September.

19—An agreement was signed in Moscow by TASS and the American ASSOCIATED PRESS agency. It will allow Soviet and foreign organizations in the USSR to receive current AP-Dow Jones financial and economic information through TASS.

24—A massive project for the development of oil deposits in Kazakhstan and for cooperation in agriculture, the processing of raw materials, and agricultural machine building was discussed at a meeting in the Kremlin between President M.S. Gorbachev of the USSR, President N.A. Nazarbayev of the Kazakh SSR, and Chairman W. Karamanov of the Kazakhstan Council of Ministers on the Soviet side, and President D. Griffin of the American Trade Consortium, Chairman of the Board D. Andreas of the ADM Corporation, Chairman of the Board W. Dierstein of the Johnson & Johnson company, and Vice-President E. Scott of the Chevron Overseas firm on the American side.

26—The U.S. Senate voted to ratify two important USSR-U.S. agreements—the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as well as the protocols to them.

27-28—E.A. Shevardnadze had two meetings with J. Baker in New York. Their conversations were an intensive search for solutions to problems in the talks on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. They managed to make perceptible progress in several areas.

28—The president of the USSR received J. Welch, chairman of the board and executive director of one of the largest U.S. companies, General Electric, in the Kremlin. They discussed specific problems connected with the cooperation by Soviet enterprises and organizations with General Electric in power engineering, aviation, and the medical industry.

29-30—A conference on joint ventures in the Soviet Union, organized by American businessmen, was held in the World Trade Center in New York.

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Articles Not Translated

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban: Hopes and Reality

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[Text] The problem of nuclear tests was engendered by the birth of the nuclear "superweapon," which led, as a result of an agonizing but historically brief process, to fundamental changes in political thinking, to the evolution of this thinking in the direction of the unconditional abandonment of the hope of establishing one's own ideology by force, and to the triumph of common human values. They became the material basis of the new thinking and of what could essentially be called common sense in intergovernmental relations.

It is obvious that when the refusal of states to settle disputes by military force and their use of exclusively political methods for this purpose become an irreversible process, the time will probably come for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This, however, is an evolutionary process. Its development is attested to by the USSR-U.S. treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the agreement on the basic provisions of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms by 50 percent, and the discussion of the possibility of negotiating the elimination of USSR and U.S. tactical nuclear arms in Europe. These achievements in the reduction of nuclear arms were made possible by the change in emphasis in USSR-U.S. and Warsaw Pact-NATO military-political relations in favor of the political resolution of intergovernmental and interbloc problems.

In connection with this, it is valid to wonder whether, now that there is a clear tendency toward reduction in USSR and U.S. nuclear arms and changing views of the role of nuclear weapons as the military-political basis of contemporary East-West relations, *the time may have come to reassess the significance of nuclear tests as a previously necessary component of the infrastructure for the existence of these weapons.*

Answering this question is not a simple matter, but if we subscribe to the belief that no one should claim to know the absolute truth and that everyone has the right to his own opinion, we can make an attempt to answer it.

Public Appeals

The issue of a nuclear test ban aroused the interest of the world public at the time of the United States' experimental 15-megaton explosion on Bikini atoll in the Pacific Ocean on 1 March 1954, when the radioactive fallout from this explosion spread far beyond the site and covered the Japanese fishing boat "Fukuriya Maru." The strong dose of radiation killed several members of the crew.

Later, forcing their way through the brambles of the cold war and the constant nuclear rivalry, the USSR, United States, and Great Britain signed a treaty in Moscow

prohibiting tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water on 5 August 1963. In essence, this was the first agreement effectively limiting the scope of the nuclear arms race.

The United States' reliance on nuclear intimidation, the Soviet military-political leadership's perceptions of the foreign policy prestige of achieving nuclear parity, and the consequent unpredictable race for nuclear arms precluded a total test ban at that time. The three powers chose an ecologically more comforting method of perfecting nuclear weapons—underground tests. Nevertheless, the 1963 treaty represented a historic frontier the world public had reached in its efforts to set up at least some obstacles to impede preparations for nuclear war. It put an end to the full-scale experiments in natural conditions to assess the parameters and effects of the destructive properties of the main ground, air, underwater, surface, and high-altitude explosions of nuclear warfare. Besides this, it also raised the cost of each individual test: According to foreign data, an underground nuclear explosion in a well costs from 6 million to 20 million dollars, and a test in a horizontal tunnel costs around 40-70 million.

Today, 27 years after the Moscow treaty was signed, the first hope of transforming the partial restrictive potential of the 1963 treaty into an essentially total nuclear test ban has appeared. This will be the subject of an international conference scheduled for January 1991 in New York.

The credit for convening the conference must be given to five non-nuclear states—Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia. Two years ago, on the 25th anniversary of the signing of the treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the three spheres, they sent the governments of the depositary countries—Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR—a proposal regarding an amendment to the treaty, which, if it is adopted, will turn it into a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTB),¹ and on 22 August 1988 Venezuela also announced its full support for the five states' proposal at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.² In March 1989, 40 countries—i.e., more than one-third of the signatories—were requesting the depositary governments for a conference to discuss this amendment. In accordance with the first paragraph of Article II, a request by this number of signatories obligates the depositary governments to convene a conference of all parties to discuss the amendment, and the second paragraph of Article II says that "any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of the parties to this treaty, including all of the original parties."

It is clear that the resolution of the problem of the nuclear test ban will depend primarily on the positions of the USSR and the United States.

The Soviet Union has always declared its willingness to stop tests on a mutual basis with the United States, but

the USSR's approach to verification issues was inconsistent because of the politically motivated secrecy that turned out to be so illusory. Ever since the beginning of perestroika the USSR's position on this matter has been changing more and more in the direction of openness to verification. In particular, in 1987 it began announcing tests of nuclear weapons, stipulating their target and yield parameters as well as the time and place. This change in approach led to the signing of protocols to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Tests (1974) and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1976) at the summit meeting in May-June 1990. The signing of these documents, envisaging unprecedented verification measures directly on the site of the experimental explosions, primarily tests of nuclear weapons, made the ratification of both treaties possible in September (United States) and October (USSR) 1990.

As we know, after announcing a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions on 6 August 1985, the Soviet Union kept it in force until the end of February 1987. The purpose of the moratorium was to set an example for the United States (and other nuclear powers) and thereby promote the move toward a total nuclear test ban.

The American Administration, however, did not reciprocate. Nevertheless, in February 1986 the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress passed a resolution by an overwhelming majority vote which was later supported by the Senate and which requested the U.S. President to take steps to ratify the 1974 and 1976 treaties and suggest the start of the negotiation of a total nuclear test ban to the USSR. The traditionally progressive stance of the House of Representatives on this matter was reaffirmed on 18 September this year when California Democrat D. Bosco's proposal that "the USSR be informed without delay of the U.S. intention to resume bilateral talks for the purpose of quickly completing the drafting of a treaty on a verifiable total nuclear test ban" was passed by a vote of 234 to 182.

In light of this, it appears that the closer interaction of the USSR Supreme Soviet and U.S. Congress during the moratorium period of 1985-1987 and particularly today, now that relations with the United States are constantly improving, would also contribute to a radical solution to the problem of nuclear tests.

The Chernobyl tragedy led to the rapid development of an antinuclear movement in the Soviet Union. A fundamental factor contributing to its birth was the formation of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement in the Kazakh SSR in February 1989, which was already holding an international congress of "Voters of the World Against Nuclear Weapons" in Alma-Ata at the end of May 1990 in conjunction with the international public organization called Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War. It was attended by around 700 representatives of 23 countries, who unanimously decided to intensify their struggle against the continuation of nuclear tests everywhere and to create an international

public center for the coordination of these actions. Despite its youth, the Soviet antinuclear movement virtually stopped the work of the USSR nuclear testing site near Semipalatinsk in the Kazakh SSR, and the Supreme Soviet of this republic decided to close down the testing range.

The antinuclear public in the USSR is also opposing the continuation of tests on a second site on Novaya Zemlya Island. The nuclear test conducted there on 24 October this year, the first since December 1988, was protested vehemently by the North European countries, the Supreme Soviet Presidium and Government of the RSFSR, and broad segments of the USSR public. It is obvious that under the conditions of the present socioeconomic and ecological state of the USSR and the strain of tense inter-ethnic relations, even the wildest imagination would have difficulty conceiving of the establishment of a new testing range for nuclear weapons.

It is completely obvious that the potential of the worldwide antinuclear movement can only be realized if its activities are competent and are coordinated daily.

Today public opinion, including antinuclear opinion, in the traditionally democratic countries is having a stronger and stronger impact on official opinion—the opinion of governments and parliaments—and in the countries of budding democracy, such as the East European states and the USSR, it is frequently the deciding factor. In the latter case it is particularly important for public opinion to be objective, unbiased, and "professional"—i.e., capable of rising above limited regional and group interests when necessary.

The development of these important qualities in the public antinuclear movement will depend largely on its treatment by official government institutions, particularly its provision with the necessary information about nuclear weapons and tests. In turn, this movement should rest on the proper scientific basis, and this presupposes the organization of public research centers.

The USSR public has demanded the cessation of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, even if only on a unilateral basis. An extended plenum of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace this September instructed USSR people's deputies from the peace movement to submit proposals on the complete cessation of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union on a unilateral basis.

It is noteworthy that the antinuclear public diplomacy in the USSR has been widely supported by parliamentary diplomacy. The supreme soviets of the Ukraine and Belorussia joined the Kazakh parliament in stating unequivocally that their territory will be a nuclear-free zone in their declarations of state sovereignty.

In connection with this, we can only regret the excessively emotional atmosphere of the hearings on the continuation of nuclear tests on the Semipalatinsk range in the Subcommittee on the Armed Forces of the USSR

Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security. The press conference on "The Semipalatinsk Test Range: Truth and Lies" on 29 June 1990, organized by a group of people's deputies of the USSR headed by N. Petrushenko, took place in the same kind of atmosphere of overheated emotions and uncompromising attitudes on the part of supporters and opponents. The situation is far from simple, after all: The future of the state's nuclear shield is at stake. It is possible that some kind of extraordinary international measures could be considered and proposed to the U.S. Congress after the new world order has been established, such as the assignment of international status to nuclear weapons as a guarantee of world security.

Nuclear policy is a constant topic of discussion in the U.S. Congress. Hearings on these matters are conducted almost every year before the appropriate Senate and House committees and are reported to the American and world public, with the exception, of course, of some specific data classified as state secrets.³

Besides this, reports on nuclear test ban issues are prepared for congressional committees, such as the report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, "Nuclear Weapons and Security: The Effects of Alternative Test Ban Treaties."⁴ Because of the accessibility of information about many military-political and military-technical aspects of nuclear weapons, an encyclopedic reference work on nuclear weapons in the world in nine volumes began to be published with the support of a non-governmental organization—the Natural Resource Defense Council. Four of the volumes have already been published.⁵ The information in these books and other unclassified data on nuclear weapons and tests provide the grounds, although certainly far from indisputable ones, for assessing the need for the continuation of nuclear tests (and we will be doing this later).

Besides this, it seems necessary to make note of an important sociopolitical aspect of U.S. nuclear policy—the legally stipulated compensation for the harmful effects of nuclear tests conducted within American territory on the population. The State of Nevada, where the nuclear test range is located, receives a billion dollars in compensation each year, according to the statements of Americans who attended the Alma-Ata congress. Just recently, in October 1990, the President of the United States signed a bill—probably with some consideration for the growing antinuclear movement—calling for the payment of compensation to the inhabitants of western states who came into contact with radioactive materials as a result of nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the 1950s and 1960s, including the right of the relatives of people who died of cancer caused by this radiation to apply for up to 50,000 dollars in compensation. The miners in uranium mines who received a dangerous dose of radiation between 1947 and 1971 have the right to seek one-time compensation of up to 100,000 dollars.

In this way, the harmful effects of underground nuclear tests as well as tests in the atmosphere on people have been acknowledged in U.S. legislation.

From the common human standpoint, the underground tests of nuclear devices, conducted after the 1963 treaty was in force, also had harmful effects on human health and the environment and were conducted solely for the purpose of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, stimulating the nuclear arms race and weakening the non-proliferation framework.

Whereas the danger to human health and the environment has evoked vehement protests from the public on the regional level, the public demands for the prohibition of these tests because of their role in stimulating the nuclear arms race and weakening the non-proliferation framework are of a completely global nature. Furthermore, the world public is assigning priority to common human values in its views on the need for a nuclear test ban.

The military-political leaders of the nuclear powers, however, on whom the judicial decision to ban nuclear tests will depend, are burdened by the need to secure national interests (as they interpret them), and this includes the protection of these interests with the aid of nuclear weapons. Because of this, they do not want to give the public complete and objective information about the need to continue nuclear tests.

As a result, the points of view of the world public and the military-political leaders of nuclear powers, with their inseparable military-industrial complexes, are antagonistic.

This is a good place to stress that the discussion of the possibility of a total test ban makes sense only on the condition that the nuclear powers stop developing fundamentally new generations of nuclear weapons and begin relying only on their existing atomic and thermonuclear weapons, of the first and second generations respectively.

Why Nuclear Tests Are Conducted

The main purpose of these tests, as we have already observed, is the development of qualitatively new generations of nuclear weapons. In other words, they assist in the search for ways, usually illusory, of undermining the established degree of strategic stability between the superpowers.

From the military-political and military-technical standpoint, tests are needed to verify the reliability of nuclear weapons in operational service. This is the first reason. Second, they are needed for the experimental verification of theories concerning the development of new generations of weapons that will be more effective in combat. Third, they are needed to study the effects of the kill mechanism of nuclear explosions on military targets and important national economic targets, to assess the

kill efficiency of weapons, and to develop ways of securing the survival of these targets.

According to many sources, nuclear weapons of the third generation are now being developed and are distinguished by their ability to generate specific casualty-producing elements and intensify them by concentrating them in the necessary direction. These might entail yield maximization, the kinetic energy of directed hypervelocity macroparticle beams, directed electromagnetic radiation, neutron radiation, beta radiation, a more intense blast with a stronger seismic shock wave, etc.⁶ Articles in the foreign press have reported that the United States conducted the first underground test with an explosive force of 3-5 kilotons in 1984 for the purpose of perfecting a nuclear device capable of generating directed electromagnetic radiation 1,000 times as strong as an ordinary nuclear warhead of the same force.

It is clear that the development of such an exotic weapon will require a substantial number of tests, because it is impossible to say a priori whether a weapon of this type will work at all, the degree to which its kill mechanism will correspond to the anticipated result in all respects, and the effects it will have on various targets. There is no question that the work on this kind of weapon is interesting and prestigious from the purely egotistical standpoint for scientists.

From the military standpoint, the third-generation nuclear weapon is viewed by its supporters as a scalpel for a "surgical" first strike—i.e., for the destruction of as many vitally important strategic targets as possible, paralyzing the other side's retaliatory capabilities, with a comparatively low number of warheads and minimal radiation and atmospheric pollution.

Therefore, the need for tests for the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons depends wholly and completely on the political decision to adopt these kinds of weapons or not.

As for the need for tests to evaluate the state of nuclear weapons in operational service, the scientific and technical aspects of the matter are significant in this context.

In January 1990 President G. Bush approved a National Security Council memorandum entitled "U.S. Policy Statement on Nuclear Testing," which specifically said: "Nuclear weapons will continue to play the deciding role in U.S. national security strategy. The United States should feel free to conduct nuclear tests to guarantee the credibility of our forces as long as necessary. In the interest of its own national security, the United States will not set limits on nuclear tests, with the exception of those stipulated in the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests."⁷

The memorandum uses the term "credibility," which, in this context, could have the narrow meaning of the reliability of the particular nuclear weapon or the broader meaning of the effectiveness of nuclear forces in general. The latter clearly presupposes the adoption of

third-generation weapons. Citing the need to develop new generations of nuclear weapons as the reason for the need to continue tests would be politically unappealing because it would underscore a commitment to the qualitative nuclear arms race. Obviously, no government will do this. For this reason, the U.S. Administration has said that the tests have to be continued in order to assess the credibility of the nuclear arsenal in operational service.

This is probably why the scientific community, including the developers of nuclear weapons, cannot state an unequivocal opinion with regard to the need for tests.

The previously mentioned reference work dealing with virtually all aspects of different types of nuclear weapons says that the United States has adopted around 70 different models of these weapons since 1945. As Congressman T. Downey (Democrat, New York) declared in April 1986, however, only 33 of the 817 nuclear tests the United States conducted during that period were conducted for the purpose of verifying the credibility of adopted weapons. This means that around 50 percent of the different models were not physically tested for credibility.

An Energy Department report to the U.S. Congress (December 1989) said that tests of 15 models of American nuclear weapons were needed after the weapons had been adopted.⁸ In the opinion of R. Kidder, a Livermore Laboratory scientist, the adopted models had to be tested because of the inadequacy of earlier tests. For example, some tests were conducted with no consideration for operational conditions (the effects of low temperatures during airborne delivery to the target—the B-61 air bomb and W-80 warhead for the air-launched cruise missile), blast safety, etc.⁹ Apparently, the developers knew there were certain flaws in some models in operational service. In other words, *the discovery of these defects was not the result of nuclear tests for credibility.*

The data on adopted models of American nuclear weapons indicate that the conventional idea of testing series-produced models of equipment for reliability, in which a certain statistically meaningful sample group is tested, is inapplicable in this case. Obviously, it would be virtually impossible to take this approach to weapons already included in the nuclear arsenal, because the demand for high credibility would require dozens of tests for some models. There is probably no need for this, because the overall reliability of nuclear weapons is guaranteed by the high degree of reliability of their elements, the duplication of the most critical of these, constructive decisions based on the considerable experience in the development of first- and second-generation weapons, and the use of non-nuclear tests.

Non-nuclear tests essentially provide a way of verifying the entire operating cycle of the weapon, right up to the creation of a highly focused and highly compressed shock wave from the explosion of a certain number of spherical segments of a chemical explosive substance with a nuclear igniting charge, the inert materials of

which could be chosen for these tests by matching their state under extremely high pressure to that of uranium-235 or plutonium-239.

In his last interview, Academician A.D. Sakharov remarked:

*"We can verify all of the circumstances connected with the storage of nuclear weapons without conducting a genuine nuclear explosion by forcing all of the systems to work, with the exception of the final nuclear explosion. If the nuclear fuel is replaced with a passive substance, the last phase will not require verification...."*¹⁰

Therefore, backed up by sound scientific and technical arguments attesting that nuclear tests are not necessary for the evaluation of the credibility of existing nuclear weapons of the first and second generations, and with a view to earlier experience, when many types of weapons were in operational service for 15-20 years, we can assume that the models in operational service, primarily strategic nuclear weapons, are guaranteed to perform their functions until the end of this century, even on the new carriers developed with a view to the tactical and technical characteristics of the models. This conclusion is corroborated by many scientists.¹¹

The possibility of the complete cessation of tests in the presence of a nuclear arsenal is also attested to by the position the USSR took at the height of the cold war—its expressed willingness to stop all nuclear tests on a mutual basis with the United States. It is difficult to believe that this position on such a fundamental strategic issue could have been taken exclusively for propaganda purposes without a thorough and expert investigation of the entire matter.

The role of underground nuclear tests in learning the destructive effects of nuclear explosions on targets could be summed up as the following: During many atmospheric tests and some high-altitude tests beyond the atmosphere (the main types of explosions in nuclear warfare), various casualty-producing elements, such as the shock wave, thermal radiation, and ionizing radiation, were investigated quite thoroughly. This is much less true of the electromagnetic radiation and x-radiation of high-altitude bursts.

Underground tests do not play an important role in judging the effects of nuclear explosions on various technical systems because of the specific conditions of these tests: the limited space and the high cost of building underground chambers of sufficient dimensions to accommodate the devices being tested and create the necessary conditions for the normal formation of the most far-reaching casualty-producing elements, such as the electromagnetic radiation of high-altitude bursts. The powerful electromagnetic emissions of this kind of explosion are generated by the formation of a large ionization sphere, which is only possible in a highly rarefied atmosphere. For this reason, when the resistance

of various technical systems to the effects of electromagnetic radiation and ionizing radiation are studied, various principles and structures simulating these casualty-producing elements are widely used (this is the only economically sound way of conducting mass experiments for these purposes).

As for studies of the casualty-producing elements of third-generation nuclear weapons, these, just as the development of the weapons themselves, will require many complex and costly tests. This is the basis for the assumption that the unilateral suspension of tests will cause a lag in knowledge of the casualty-producing elements of third-generation nuclear weapons, even if their adoption is not being considered.

Finally, we should say a few words about the verification of a total nuclear test ban. Above all, we should take note of the obvious fact that *a total ban is easier to verify than a limited one*. The present level of USSR-U.S. mutual understanding in this area, exemplified by the protocols signed in June this year to the 1974 and 1976 treaties, suggests that no insoluble problems in the organization of effective verification will arise if both sides should make the political decision to stop all nuclear tests.

Therefore, *current tendencies in USSR-U.S. and East-West military-political relations and the scientific and technical level of existing nuclear weapons constitute a sound basis for political decisions on the complete cessation of USSR and U.S. nuclear tests*.

Is There a Chance of a Total Ban?

Obviously, making the political decision to stop all nuclear tests will not be that simple. Nuclear weapons are a phenomenon of critical importance to mankind. They are the most destructive weapons ever conceived by the eternally inquisitive human mind, and the irrationality of their use led mankind to an unconditional need for the implementation of the most humane idea of interpersonal relations—the resolution of disputes exclusively by peaceful, political methods.

It is true that the restructuring of political thinking in this direction is still far from an irreversible process. This is attested to by Iraqi "leader" Husayn's aggression against the small state of Kuwait at a time when the world has begun taking its first breaths of the "warmer" political air. Because of this, the physical presence of nuclear weapons will probably be necessary for some time as a "preceptor" of changes in political thinking (but they will require a new status to play this role).¹²

There is no question that the events in the Persian Gulf will have a far from positive effect on the work of the conference on the revision of the 1963 treaty and, in general, on the resolution of the problem of banning nuclear tests, because they could give the United States and Great Britain additional arguments against the amendment calling for a comprehensive ban. On the other hand, by strengthening the position of the supporters of nuclear non-proliferation (the world is well

aware of Husayn's strong pleas for nuclear weapons of his own), these events have also strengthened the arguments in favor of the cessation of tests.

Nevertheless, the most common opinion is that the United States (and Great Britain) will object to the amendment.

The U.S. Administration's main argument against it will probably still be the need for tests to secure the credibility of the nuclear arsenal. We can expect the U.S. position to be supported completely by Great Britain.

It is indicative that the only mention of nuclear tests in President Bush's report on U.S. strategy in the national security sphere, sent to the Congress on 20 March 1990, said that the signing of the protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties would pave the way for their ratification and enactment. No other steps in this area were mentioned.

Because of its prohibitive essence, the 1963 treaty cannot be supplemented with an amendment to limit underground nuclear explosions (for example, to lower the threshold of underground tests to under 150 kilotons or to set annual limits on the number of tests), which would probably be the most acceptable option to the United States. At the conference the choice will be between a total ban on nuclear tests or new agreements in the case of further limits on underground tests.

The Soviet Union, judging by current events, should support the amendment. Without any exaggeration, we can say that the USSR made a great effort on the political level before and after the conclusion of the 1963 treaty to achieve a total ban on tests of nuclear weapons, and the effort was not always futile from the standpoint of mutuality with the United States. Some political will was displayed by President J. Carter, for example, and the tripartite talks on the total prohibition of these tests between the USSR, United States, and Great Britain began in 1977.

At that time the world public was pleased by the promising results. It seemed—and this is what the Soviet and Western press reported—that there was almost complete agreement on the treaty. Regrettably, the experience and the results of the talks were undeservedly forgotten. Today it is difficult to say unequivocally whether these tests would have ended with the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, although not many portions of the text were still being deliberated by the delegations.

The foreign policy atmosphere of the late 1970s, however, including the deployment of the SS-20 missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union, the venture in Afghanistan, and the demagogic stance declared by the USSR's military-political leadership of that time on the verification of nuclear tests, broke the fragile shoots of East-West trust.

If the negotiators of that time could come that close to drafting an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear tests, today the job would seem to be much easier because all of the necessary military-political conditions for the achievement of this kind of agreement actually exist, and especially for an agreement by the USSR, United States, and Great Britain.

It is probable that an atmosphere so conducive to the objective discussion and resolution of this problem with a view to the interests of the entire interdependent human community has never existed before.

Several incidents, although they have not been that decisive, can be viewed as evidence of the probability of the United States' choice of a more flexible stance.

First of all, in view of the reduction of military budgets and the reduction of the danger of a conflict between the superpowers, Secretary of Energy J. Watkins asked the three main nuclear laboratories in the United States to expand non-military research in such spheres as new sources of energy, ecology, and industrial competitiveness. When Watkins addressed Congress, he said that he wanted to see major changes in the laboratories' fields of research.

Second, the intensity of nuclear tests diminished somewhat in the first half of 1990: The fourth announced test was conducted on 25 July, but in 1989 there had already been six tests by that date.

Third, the majority of members of the House of Representatives favored the immediate commencement of USSR-U.S. talks on a total nuclear test ban.

There is also the objective possibility of certain changes that would be acceptable to the United States. The amendment could be in force for a limited period of 3 to 5 years, with its subsequent renewal depending on the military-political atmosphere in the world. In this case, as we have already said, the United States could remain confident of the credibility of its nuclear arsenal.

During the earlier talks between the USSR, United States, and Great Britain, a 5-year agreement was first discussed and then a 3-year agreement was considered. According to P. Warnke, who was then the head of the American delegation at the talks and the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the suspension of all tests for periods of this length would not destroy the nuclear test infrastructure.

In essence, this approach would also be applicable to the situation with regard to nuclear tests in the USSR when the unilateral complete cessation of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union might be considered because conditions for the deployment of nuclear weapons will exist only within the territory of the RSFSR.

In summation, therefore, we could say that *there is some chance—or, more precisely, some hope—that the efforts of the states party to the 1963 treaty, which want to add an*

amendment to the treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, might be successful in the presence of well-coordinated support from the international public antinuclear movement and the willingness to compromise, the need for which is dictated by several distinctive features of the current international situation.

Even this conditional optimistic forecast depends on many factors. In particular, the development of events in the Persian Gulf could have an unpredictable negative effect on disarmament processes, including, or even primarily, nuclear disarmament.

The results of the conference in New York will depend on the importance the political leaders of the three nuclear powers attach to the opinions of the non-nuclear peaceful states with the energetic support of the international public.

Footnotes

1. The demand for a CTB treaty (CTB is the abbreviation of the English name—comprehensive test ban) has become a slogan uniting virtually all antinuclear forces in the world.

2. UN Doc A/43/597; Doc CD/860.

3. See, for example, "Nuclear Testing: Arms Control Opportunities. Hearing..." 28 June 1988; "Test Ban Issues. Hearing..." 6 October 1988.

4. "Nuclear Weapons and Security: The Effects of Alternative Test Ban Treaties," report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, June 1989.

5. "Nuclear Weapons Databook": vol I—"U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities," Cambridge, 1984; vol II—"U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production," Cambridge; vol III—"U.S. Nuclear Warhead Facility Profiles," Cambridge, 1987; vol IV—"Soviet Nuclear Weapons," New York, 1989.

6. T. Taylor, "Third-Generation Nuclear Weapons," V MIRE NAUKI, 1987, No 6, pp 4-14.

7. "U.S. Policy Statement on Nuclear Testing," quoted in: P. Richards and L. Sykes, "Verification of Limits on Nuclear Testing: A Review of Historical, Technical and Political Issues" (draft), New York, 1990.

8. "Program Status of Preparation for Further Limitation of Nuclear Testing," Annual Report to the Congress by the Department of Energy, vol 1 (unclassified version), FY 1989.

9. R. Kidder, "Maintaining the U.S. Stockpile of Nuclear Weapons During a Low-Threshold or Comprehensive Test Ban," LLNL Report UCRL-53820 (unclassified version), Livermore, 1987.

10. Quoted in ZA RUBEZHOM, 1990, No 23, p 9.

11. "Nuclear Weapons Databook," vols I-IV; "Program Status of Preparation..."; R. Kidder, Op. cit.

12. When this article was already being prepared for publication, IZVESTIYA (8 November 1990) published Academician V. Goldanskiy's article "UN Nuclear Forces?" I feel obliged to say that I agree wholeheartedly with the ideas he expresses and support them completely.

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Import of Capital: A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed

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[Article by Aleksandr Mayevich Volkov, candidate of economic sciences and junior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] The virtually complete disregard for the century of experience accumulated by other countries is one of the many reasons for the unsatisfactory state of the Soviet Union's international economic relations. This is particularly obvious when decisions are made and carried out on the attraction of foreign private capital¹ into the Soviet economy. One of the main reasons why Western businessmen have been slow to invest in our economy is the plethora of regulations in the first documents on foreign economic activity, which has been justified with the explanation that "these were our first steps, and we had virtually no experience and countless misgivings!"²

There is no question that fear and risk are present in any new economic venture, and no one can avoid them, but the first steps in the formation of joint ventures in the USSR could have been taken much more confidently if they had been preceded by thorough analytical preparation. Even the most cursory glance at world practices in the import of capital should have warned us that the obligatory requirement that the chairman of the board and general director of the joint venture be Soviet citizens would restrict the rights of foreign partners, and that the limitation of foreign capital participation to 49 percent would reduce the profits of foreign partners and would prevent the freeing of Soviet capital for investment in other branches of the economy, thereby diminishing the impact of the attraction of financial resources from abroad. It took almost 2 years to get rid of the harmful restrictions we had instituted to our own detriment.

Today, now that the most odious surface obstacles to the import of capital have been eliminated, we have a situation in which we could try to turn the flow of foreign financial capital into a strong factor of Soviet economic growth.

The experience of the leading capitalist states tells us that a reasonable approach to the import of capital could turn it into an important element of Soviet economic development. According to our calculations, during the period of cyclical prosperity in the 1980s in the United States, foreigners provided around 15 percent of the funds American corporations mobilized by issuing securities and applying for credit. These resources constitute a sum equivalent to around 25 percent of the investments in national economic development in the USSR between 1985 and 1988.³ Besides this, the import of capital has a significant cumulative effect on the economy of the host country. According to the author's calculations, for example, each dollar the United States borrowed abroad increased total demand in the U.S. economy by 4.2 dollars. This means that the share of the American GNP created by foreign finances is around 17.8 percent. These data provide a quantitative assessment of the advantages our country could derive in the future from the import of capital.⁴ The main thing is to make a fundamental political decision on earnest efforts to attract foreign finances to our country.

The next step, and one of vital importance, will be the planning of a comprehensive strategy of capital imports, coordinated with the priorities of the socioeconomic development of the republics and the USSR as a whole and taking all world experience into account. This strategy will necessitate the correction of many stereotypes.

Basic Outlines of Strategy

The capital import strategy should probably be mapped out in two interrelated areas: first of all, the study of the attraction of financial resources from abroad as an instrument to integrate the USSR into the world economic community; second, an analysis of the forms and methods of using foreign investments as a factor alleviating the severity of our country's internal economic problems.

The basic premises of a capital import strategy for the optimal inclusion of the USSR in world economic relations will define the national interests of our country in the developing structure of economic and political interdependence and the economic security criteria adopted by its leadership. These matters constitute a separate field of research which will not be discussed in this article. We will concentrate on the second element of the process of mapping out a capital import strategy—the analysis of the forms and methods of using this capital for the development of the USSR economy.

The experience of countries which have been attracting foreign resources for a long time attests to a high percentage of loan capital in total imported finances during periods of intensive restructuring like the present processes in the USSR. This was true of the United States in the second half of the 19th century, and the same tendencies were seen in the American economy during the structural changes that were stepped up after the

middle of the 1970s: The percentage of loan capital in total foreign financial resources operating in the United States rose by almost 25 percent just between 1980 and 1986.⁵ This broadens a country's investment opportunities because it assists in the accomplishment of two important elements of restructuring: It increases total capital investments at a time of limited resources without lowering the public standard of living and intensifies intersectorial transfers of capital.

The virtual absence of the joint-stock form of ownership in the USSR and the underdeveloped banking system would preclude the consideration of the import of loan capital in the near future even if there were the desire to do this. The economic transformations in our country, however, will necessitate financial resources in precisely this form. This is why the capital import strategy should presuppose radical changes in the situation. The need to establish a securities market in the USSR and to reform the credit system radically has already been substantiated sufficiently from the standpoint of purely domestic economic objectives, but foreign economic considerations are more than just another argument in favor of this course of action. The fundamental distinction of the external factor is its rigidity. Whereas internal objectives can dictate the invention of various transitional and hybrid mechanisms for the intersectorial transfer of resources and forms of ownership, the *attraction of substantial amounts of foreign loan capital will only be possible after a highly efficient banking system has been established and the joint-stock form of ownership has been developed* to guarantee the owners of securities a real income. This is why the capital import strategy must be focused immediately only on maximum radical reform in the areas mentioned above. Otherwise, the existence of the strategy itself will be impossible.

Until these favorable conditions have been established in the USSR, the capital import strategy should stress the maximum efficiency of the existing form of foreign private investment—joint ventures.

One way of improving the activities of foreign investors in the USSR could be the *revision of the present concept of joint ventures*. In the alternative approach, the main objective would not be the formation of the ventures, but their transformation into a factor generating economic activity in the region where the venture is formed with the participation of foreign capital. Then the joint venture will no longer represent a unique enclave of the market economy, dependent on deliveries of components from abroad, but *an economic center capable of creating a new production and social infrastructure*, retooling the enterprises of Soviet subcontractors, and developing the banking network serving it. In this way, the main emphasis would not be on the immediate attainment of a product, but the establishment of the material-technical and social foundation for the subsequent manufacture of this product. In addition to reducing the dependence on imports, the comprehensive approach to joint ventures would stimulate economic growth considerably in the parts of the country where

these enterprises operate. Foreign experience testifies that this stimulation can be accomplished by encouraging local producers to manufacture goods, creating additional jobs in the region and a social infrastructure, and increasing the purchasing power of the population.

This approach will only be made possible by the elimination of discrimination against joint ventures by Soviet legislative bodies, and especially by Soviet executive agencies. Normal cooperation between joint ventures and Soviet enterprises is impossible when the former have to pay the equivalent of 5 million rubles in foreign currency for a hectare of land while the latter get the land for free. Joint ventures will never become a serious factor in Soviet economic development if they are kept in the position of "currency hostages" by executive agencies, as was the case when the decision was made on the payment of the Moscow hotel bills of foreign guests in hard currency. The main argument in favor of this move was the following: "They (the joint ventures) have this currency, and this is why they were formed." Meanwhile, this kind of tribute is not collected from the tens of thousands of Soviet enterprises which were granted the right to operate directly in the foreign market for the same purposes.

The specific steps to improve the status of joint ventures could include the alleviation of their tax burden, the relaxation of the inflexible rules of profit repatriation and their replacement with the stipulation of a compulsory percentage of Soviet components to be used in the manufactured product, which should be reached, for instance, within 5 years after the formation of the joint venture, and agreement on specific procedures for the resolution of social problems.

Another way of enhancing the national economic impact of capital imports is the development of other forms of direct foreign investment, particularly *the transfer of our enterprises to complete ownership by foreign businessmen*. The foreign investor who is a full-fledged owner of a plant, factory, bank, or restaurant will be more interested in the profitable operation of the enterprise. He will be free to choose the method of establishing production units (building new plants or re-equipping existing ones), production organization and management methods, and the product assortment. The foreign businessman who is not bound by the state plan and numerous departmental regulations will concentrate on satisfying the existing demand in the USSR for various types of industrial equipment and consumer goods. This will make a substantial amount of capital available in the Soviet economy for investment in other branches.

The first step could be the introduction of changes into the law on the taxes collected from enterprises, associations, and organizations, in accordance with which the tax rate on the profits of joint ventures with over 30-percent participation by foreign capital would be higher than for those with a smaller share of foreign participation.

If the decision is made to turn Soviet enterprises over to foreign businessmen, the appropriate laws and regulations will have to be drafted, such as statutes on investment incentives and protection and on guarantees and insurance for foreign property in the USSR, and decisions will have to be made on the best economic sectors and national regions for the establishment of foreign production units (with a differentiated system of privileges), a taxation system geared to the sale of part of the manufactured goods in the USSR will have to be organized, etc.

Investment guarantee statutes will also help Soviet organizations acquire property abroad on an equal basis with businessmen from capitalist countries. In view of the high percentage of oil in our exports, for example, it would be quite realistic to acquire a network of gas stations in Western Europe. The USSR could be the owner of the trade firms selling the domestic products in demand abroad.

An important element of the capital import strategy should be *precise statistics of foreign finances entering the USSR*. When this system is being established, it will be extremely important to formulate single, unambiguous definitions of various forms of capital (in the United States, for example, the treasury and commerce departments, the Federal Reserve System, and other agencies use different definitions for portfolio investments, and this results in confused estimates and complicates the coordination of strategy with regard to these forms of foreign capital). Besides this, it will be important to formulate a system of indicators to provide some idea of the dynamics of each form of foreign finances operating in the Soviet economy and to determine the agency responsible for the statistics of foreign capital in the USSR. We already have several contenders for this position—the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Finance, the State Committee for Statistics, and the Foreign Economic Bank. Each of these agencies will need precise and up-to-date data on the scales and spheres of foreign investment in the Soviet economy. The experience of the United States has shown us, however, that statistics of foreign capital are less effective when separate records are kept simultaneously by several agencies. For this reason, the most probable alternative will consist in the concentration of all of these functions in one agency or the instruction of each separate agency to keep records of specific forms of foreign capital: The State Committee for Statistics, for example, could be responsible for keeping statistics of direct capital investment, the Ministry of Finance could keep records of portfolio investments, and the Foreign Economic Bank could analyze bank deposit information.

Barriers to Foreign Capital

The obstacles keeping foreign finances out of the Soviet economy could be divided into three groups: ideological, economic, and technical.⁶

The ideological barriers are the stereotypes of public thinking in our country and the excessively confined nature of our territory.

The failure of public thinking to meet the needs of the development of foreign economic ties is largely due to the suspicious and apprehensive view of foreign capital in the Soviet economy. This view is expressed in a broad range of ways: from indignant letters to the news media about the alleged plans to sell "sacred Soviet land" to foreigners to the reveling in the "sale of America," which would seem to have no connection whatsoever with our country. The important thing, however, is not specific cases, but the general approach to foreign capital in the economy of any country. Until our domestic economists and political analysts stop telling the public that the export of capital is a sign of imperialist expansion and that the import of capital almost always leads to the loss of national sovereignty, the conditions for the broad-scale attraction of foreign capital cannot be established in our country.

Another important obstacle is that *the territory of our country is still closed to foreign citizens*. In this connection, it would seem advisable to form a special commission, consisting of representatives of the KGB, the Defense Ministry, and other concerned agencies, to define the specific parts of the USSR where foreigners will not be allowed to go or will require special permission. The rest of the Soviet Union should be open to foreign businessmen.

The list of economic barriers to foreign finances in the USSR must include the absence of a securities market in our country, the lack of free trade in the means of production, and the complete inability of enterprises dealing with foreign partners to make autonomous decisions.

Whereas there are strong arguments in favor of the gradual elimination of the first two obstacles, *direct participants in foreign economic relations can and should be granted genuine independence today*. I speak of genuine independence because the formally declared right to operate on the foreign market autonomously does not grant this freedom. The proposal of the Soviet-English TOE firm, for example, on the joint production of a new washing machine based on our "Vyatka," which was backed up by a contract of half a million, took 2 years to win approval in our country, or half a year longer than it takes a new item to make the journey from the designer's blueprint to store counters in the United States. Regrettably, this is not the exception, but the rule. It took two Soviet-English firms the same length of time to gain authorization for the establishment of a joint-stock group of enterprises in Moscow to operate directly in the British market. The main objections were voiced by the departments and ministries asserting that this transaction would be "contrary to the policies of our government." To make foreign economic ties genuinely effective, enterprises engaged in joint projects with foreign firms must be provided with the necessary conditions, in

which they will have no need to seek countless authorizations and will be able to operate independently of state plan priorities.

The technical obstacles include the unsolved problem of the repatriation of the profits of joint ventures and the difficult situation with the personnel expected to carry out the USSR's plans in the sphere of foreign economic operations.

The difficulty of realizing the profits of joint ventures is one of the main obstacles discouraging foreign investment in the Soviet economy. The problem was essentially engendered by the non-convertibility of the ruble. Neither we nor our foreign partners, however, can wait until the Soviet monetary unit becomes one of the freely convertible currencies. Consequently, we must find other solutions to this problem. In addition to the common practice of giving foreigners part of the product, equivalent to their share of profits, other solutions could also be employed. There is a chance, for example, that joint ventures could be diversified by building new enterprises or acquiring existing ones. Today, however, the expansion of the joint venture's sphere of operations in our country is deterred by the impossibility of acquiring the means of production freely. For this reason, the diversification of joint ventures can only be regarded as a theoretical solution to the problem of profit repatriation at this time, because it will require the creation of an investment commodity market in the USSR.

The use of the USSR's comparative advantages in the scientific and technical sphere seems more realistic. Foreign businessmen could use their share of the profits in rubles to set up scientific research or experimental design laboratories, centers, and institutes in existing production units. The results of the activities of these establishments will be patents on inventions or improvements which can be taken out of the USSR much more profitably than, for example, rubles exchanged for dollars. Besides this, the use of the patented invention in production at other enterprises belonging to the same owner will generate additional profits. There is no question that there are other, perhaps more effective methods of "getting around" the non-convertible ruble. For this reason, it will be important not to be discouraged by a seemingly insurmountable obstacle, but to make every effort to circumvent it.

An equally serious obstacle to the formation of joint ventures in the USSR is that *Soviet personnel are unprepared for the new working conditions*. Above all, this includes the virtually complete absence of elementary commercial knowledge. According to the foreign employees of Soviet-American joint ventures, our personnel might not, for example, answer the telephone at all or might simply pick up the receiver and immediately hang up. Soviet personnel are not accustomed to asking the caller for his name, and simply tell their American colleagues that "someone called."

The professional incompetence of Soviet managers also evokes many complaints. Personnel difficulties in the sphere of foreign economic ties are so serious that the Italian AZEM firm made a move unprecedented in the world of international business: It presented the Moscow Higher Commercial School of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations with computers worth 200,000 dollars and installed them for free. On the one hand, this was certainly a wonderful gift, attesting to the Italians' interest in perestroika and support for it, but on the other it is certainly embarrassing that the foreigners had to spend their own money to bring our managers up to the professional level at which they could work with them.

Obviously, it will be impossible to solve the personnel problems in the sphere of foreign economic operations with only the internal resources of the USSR. Few of the leading specialists in this sphere in our country have enough professional knowledge to train qualified experts in international business. The difficulties are compounded by the growing number of enterprises in contact with foreign partners, which is increasing the need for thoroughly trained personnel each day. For this reason, one of the main ways of training personnel for foreign economic operations should consist in the dramatic augmentation of the number of Soviet managers studying abroad and the expansion of student exchanges in higher academic institutions. The establishment of foreign academic institutions in our own country, with courses taught by foreign and Soviet instructors, is an intriguing possibility.

It is most probable, however, that the personnel problems will not be solved completely until the radical economic reforms have been completed. At this time the internal and external conditions and laws of economic activity are so different that today's manager in the USSR effectively has to have two different identities, and the experience and skills one acquires are virtually useless to the other.

Local Soviets and Attraction of Foreign Capital

The experience of the leading capitalist states testifies that when a capital import strategy is being elaborated, especially in cases involving direct investment, particular attention must be paid to the regional distribution of foreign finances. Participation by foreign capital is far from uniform in the economic development of different parts of the United States: In the middle of the 1980s around 10 percent of the people employed in the U.S. manufacturing industry worked at enterprises belonging to foreigners, but the respective figures for the states of Delaware, Alaska, and West Virginia were 47.5 percent, 20.2 percent, and 19.8 percent.⁸ These data raise a fundamental question: Who in the host country should take the initiative in setting regional priorities for the distribution of foreign capital investments—the central government or local authorities? In other words, who decided that foreign capital should play a more important role in these states than in the country as a whole—

the federal government or the governments of these states? It would seem that obligations to attract foreign direct capital investments are divided among central and local government agencies. The federal government concentrates on establishing the overall favorable conditions to encourage foreign businessmen to invest their capital in the American economy. Competition between states plays the deciding role in the distribution of this capital among specific regions of the country. Local governments pass the laws that turn the territory under their jurisdiction into more appealing sites of investment than other regions. For all of the more than 200-year history of the United States, this mechanism has proved to be effective and has done much to promote the nation's economic success. In the USSR ministries and all-union associations still have priority in making decisions on the organization of joint ventures. As a rule, the first step is taken by...foreigners, who make their proposals to the appropriate ministry, which then decides where the joint ventures will be located. Local soviets, on the other hand, have taken virtually no initiative in attracting foreign capital. Today almost everyone agrees that the soviets should be granted the right to set regional development priorities. In the sphere of international operations, however, they have virtually no authority.

We feel that the right of local agencies to attract foreign direct investments to their territory autonomously should be a central element of our capital import strategy. According to U.S. statistics, each dollar invested by state governments in foreign economic activity attracted almost 667 "foreign" dollars and produced 16 dollars in net income.⁹

To attract foreign direct capital investments, local soviets should be endowed with sweeping economic powers. This presupposes *the radical reform of relations between central and local government agencies*, primarily in such matters as *the right to allocate land and collect taxes*.

The active role of regional officials is incompatible with the current situation, in which central departments decide the geographic location of joint ventures. Everyone knows of numerous examples of the inefficient distribution of productive forces in the country as a result of the center's monopoly right to choose enterprise construction sites. If the same practice is employed in the establishment of joint ventures, these enterprises will cease to be a means of eliminating disparities in the Soviet economy and will turn into a cause of even more pronounced imbalances. For this reason, local officials should have the right to allocate land in their regions for the construction of joint enterprises. Under the conditions of regional economic accountability, this will promote genuinely sound projects, coordinated well with the personnel, raw material, and transport capabilities of the territory.

The redistribution of taxation rights among central and local authorities will be equally important. The new tax system presupposes the reduction of union taxes and a

corresponding increase in the taxes collected by local agencies to supplement their own budgets. Above all, there should be a tax on the use of land, buildings, and installations, and local soviets should be empowered to collect this tax. The rate of taxation could be lowered or raised depending on the need for foreign capital. The regulation of new foreign investment in this way could be supplemented with the right of local officials to set the amortization terms of equipment operating within their territory, lower taxes, or exempt enterprises from taxation completely.

There are also other methods local officials can use to make their regions more appealing than others to foreign investors. In the West, for example, the issuance of "industrial development bonds" has become a common practice. The common feature uniting the different types of bonds is their issuance by local governments (similar to the state loan bonds of the USSR) for the purpose of mobilizing funds to assist foreign investors in the development of production. These financial resources can be offered in the form of credit on preferential terms. Local governments can acquire production facilities and rent them. In this case, the foreigners would not have to pay a property tax. Furthermore, rental payments are incomparable to the cost of acquiring production units.

World practice testifies, however, that arranging for a system of incentives to attract foreign capital is only half the battle. Purely internal measures have to be supplemented with *effective publicity of the advantages of investing capital in the given region*. This could be done by regional chambers of commerce with representative agencies in the largest and most probable investor-countries. These agencies should seek out potential investors, establish business contacts with them, and find mutually acceptable solutions if the opinions of local soviets and foreign businessmen do not agree in certain areas. The importance of this kind of permanent activities in countries exporting capital is attested to by the activities of U.S. local governments: 29 states were represented in a total of 65 overseas agencies in the middle of the 1980s. The expenditures of the agencies of some states on the attraction of foreign capital constituted from 60 to 100 percent of the total expenditures of overseas representatives of U.S. local governments. This concentration of efforts in the attraction of foreign capital clearly warrants consideration, and the possibility of creating local international chambers of commerce and overseas agencies representing individual republics, oblasts, and regions of our country must be considered during the elaboration of a capital import strategy.

Footnotes

1. The attraction and use of the credits of foreign states and international organizations represent a separate topic which will not be covered in this article.
2. IZVESTIYA, 4 January 1989.
3. Calculations based on the official rate of exchange.

4. Obviously, the use of foreign financial resources to stimulate economic development does not have an exclusively positive effect on the economy of the host country. The attraction of funds from abroad, for example, increases the deficit in the balance of payments and augments outgoing resources in the form of interest payments on loans. Many of the negative features connected with the import of capital, however, can be avoided in the presence of a carefully planned program for the use of foreign resources.

5. For a more detailed discussion, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1988, No 12, pp 54-61.

6. The non-convertibility of the ruble is not included in this group because its negative effects on the USSR's foreign economic relations have already been examined in detail in Soviet economic literature and because plans are being made on the governmental level to turn the ruble into a currency suitable for use in the world marketplace.

7. PRAVDA, 10 April 1989.

8. Calculated according to data in "U.S. Department of Commerce. Regional Aspects of Foreign Direct Investment, 1986," Table 8.

9. M. and S. Tolchin, "Buying into America," New York, 1988, p 52.

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U.S., USSR Regional Conflict-Solving Viewed

AU1302060091 Moscow SSHA, EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 90 (signed to press 27 Nov 90) pp 47-52

[Article by Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremen'yuk, doctor of historical sciences, deputy director of Academy of Sciences' USA and Canada Institute—"On the path toward the settlement of conflicts"]

[Text] The focus of attention in American writings has shifted toward the mitigation or limitation of conflicts. The raising of this issue within the overall objective of achieving a settlement comes as a new and quite attractive idea, so long as it is not forgotten, of course, that our chief aim is the complete resolution of existing conflicts and the prevention of new ones. The pursuit of conflict limitation appears to be an attempt to find a new angle on the problem, in the knowledge that settlement of a crisis is hard to achieve and that protracted crises are a major source of instability in the international system. This is demonstrated, among other things, by events in the Persian Gulf.

Without canceling out the objective of achieving a settlement, the idea of mitigating or limiting conflicts seems to be an attempt to find a way of reducing the conflict potential of dangerous discords, and to bring about, if not an end to them, then at least the acceptance of

certain "ground rules". These rules would help stabilize the situation, prevent escalation, and find a way of reducing the level of violence. If this approach were introduced, the chances of finding a political solution to conflicts in certain parts of the world would be considerably increased, since it would enable the processes of national reconciliation and democratic elections to be started and the more dangerous tensions to be removed.

American writers, like many of their Soviet colleagues, proceed from certain fundamental assumptions. First, the "conspiracy" or "foreign interference" theory, which did so much damage, has been finally cast aside. For many years it stopped people from taking the sensible view of regional conflicts as the product of local discord, and, on the contrary, implanted in them the idea that most of these conflicts were due to foreign interference. For American experts it was "communist subversion", and for Soviet experts—"imperialist intrigues". The established view was that, against the general background of the historical and economic backwardness of many developing countries, local frictions, discord, and long-unresolved religious and ethnic problems sooner or later lead to clashes. This we learned from our own experience.

Second, the Americans are earnestly investigating the possibilities for the great powers to settle conflict relations, both between each another, and within or between third countries. Here our approaches differ considerably. There are telling differences in our general political cultures, traditions, and political education and breeding. Each political culture has shaped its own particular attitude to conflicts in general and conflict settlement in particular.

The American "general theory of conflict" is based on the fact that conflict is fundamentally a normal occurrence. The inevitable differences of opinion that exist in society are bound to flare up periodically into conflict unless care is taken. They should therefore be viewed as something ordinary, and attempts must be made to mitigate, settle, limit and prevent them. Out of this interpretation a whole science, which has developed an enormous array of means for mediation in conflicts, arbitration, negotiation, and so forth has evolved. In this context, interference from above, by state or federal authorities, is an extreme measure, taken when all other means are useless and there is the danger of escalation. However, the main trend in settling conflicts is the stress on efforts made by the parties themselves and the encouragement of patience, reason and willingness to compromise in order to preserve the integrity of society, the family, and peace.

Our culture in this area was shaped in a different way. Above all else, conflict and struggle were viewed almost as the chief objective of society and the ruling party. History was seen principally as a class struggle, a struggle between social systems and powers. The aim of conflict itself was stated to be total and unconditional victory, and compromise was held to be either a subject not fit

for discussion, or simply a tactical ploy, a retreat in the face of circumstance (the theory of compromise put forward by V.I. Lenin in his "Left-wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder".¹) For this reason the attitude toward the resolution of conflicts—any conflicts, be they internal or external—was that they should be suppressed by force, either administrative, military or political. Realization of the necessity for settlement began to come with time, influenced by the menace of nuclear war. Hence the compromises over the Cuban crisis in 1962, the Afghan settlement in 1988, and many others.

Despite all the difficulties in juxtaposing the two different political cultures and approaches to conflicts, practice and common sense nevertheless compelled both sides to substantially review their attitude toward one another and to crisis situations in general. It came to be realized that a future conflict between the superpowers was not at all inevitable, and that despite their different approaches, they could find a way of coexisting in a single, interdependent world. Now this is generally accepted, but for a long time it seemed to many people, both in the Soviet Union and the United States, that the logical extension of their rivalry could only be conflict. They prepared themselves for this both mentally and physically, enumerating the various scenarios of defeat and victory, and drawing up plans for survival and even possible reconstruction after nuclear war. Scientists managed to prove that hope of victory and survival in such a war was madness, that in a nuclear war there would be neither victor nor vanquished, and it was only when this knowledge permeated through into politics that people began to come to their senses, and led to the new political thinking.

It has to be said that even this thinking did not come about immediately. For many years after the top echelons of power in both countries had begun to realize the necessity of preventing nuclear war, the striving to gain the upper hand through use of force continued by sheer momentum. Global conflict between the two world systems was broken down into various levels and fields, and hopes were nursed of being able to score points in military competition by new weapon systems, new allies, and the projection of military might into certain parts of the world and the seas and oceans. Fear and distrust, together with pressure from flagwaving patriots and smart operators in the military-industrial complex, did something that neither of the opponents had managed to do to the other: Both sides were actively exhausting their resources by continuing the senseless arms race, despatching weapons to all corners of the globe, and arming millions of people who were at an active, creative stage of life.

It was actually in the early 1980's that the USSR and the United States began to compete as to who would be the first to come to their senses and say: "Enough. We have to stop." Our internal upheavals, the frequent change of leaders in 1982-1985, prevented us from doing this earlier, although it was our resources that were being

exhausted at a particularly rapid rate: the war in Afghanistan, the enormous and, as it turned out, senseless expenditure on building intermediate- and short-range missile systems, etc. Because of this, it was our economy that began to run into difficulties. The Americans played a waiting game. President Reagan had secured enough support in political and business circles to unleash a new spiral in the arms race, although sober-minded experts on the U.S. economy warned the leadership and the public that even the strong American economy could not withstand a long period of excessive strain. After M.S. Gorbachev was elected CPSU Central Committee General Secretary in 1985, the first sensible proposals issued from the Kremlin. In the fall of that year, the leaders of the two countries met in Geneva to begin a substantive dialog.

The grave problem arose as to how to emerge from the state of conflict. For years in the history of mankind, leaders had known how to begin conflicts, how to pursue them, and how to strive for victory. Although it was an art that not all of them possessed in equal measure, there was still a body of knowledge about conflict strategy which could suggest ways of achieving victory. However, when the opposite kind of problem arose, which could be described as "emerging from conflict undefeated," it immediately became apparent that here neither science, nor human experience, could suggest a sufficiently persuasive mode of conduct. They had to improvise, relying on the new political thinking as a guidance.

The strategy of emergence from conflict also broke down into several independent, but interrelated, areas. Talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic, intermediate-range, short-range and conventional weapons were continued and broadened. A considerable success was achieved with the signing of the INF Treaty in December 1987. The slowdown in the pace of this process in subsequent years may be put down to two things: the increasing technical and diplomatic complexities (the latter arising out of the start of the multilateral talks on conventional weapons in Europe), and the insufficient development of direct Soviet-U.S. links in the sphere of economics, culture, science and education. None of this helped to rapidly allay the fears and suspicions that arose during the cold war, although it also did not prevent such a level of relations being achieved when that war was considered over.

While both powers were taking steps in the field of direct bilateral relations, they also concentrated on the problems of regional conflicts. It seemed initially that, as the great powers disentangled themselves from those conflicts, in particular as the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, the prospects of finding a settlement should grow significantly. It was from this standpoint that the agreement on Afghanistan, linking the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the attainment of political stability in the country, was signed in 1988.

However, subsequent developments in Afghanistan showed that, while paying justice to the efforts of the

great powers in bringing about a settlement, one should not underestimate the part played by local and regional forces, which very frequently operate in the shadow of the great powers, but which in fact determine both the nature and the intensity of the conflict. Moreover, it is those forces that provoke interference by the great powers, after which the conflict begins to assume the appearance of yet another East-West clash, although in reality it will have been born out of religious intolerance, the desire to redraw borders, or simply the striving to ransack a weaker neighbor.

Here the principle of the independence and sovereignty of the liberated countries has played a negative role. By supporting their friends and allies in the Third World for years, the USSR and the United States believed that they had substantial influence, enabling them to view those friends and allies as an asset in their competition against each other. It was, however, simply an illusion of influence. If a Third-World regime for whatever reason had an argument with the United States and then uttered the magic words "socialist orientation," it automatically became a Soviet friend and was given all kinds of aid, particularly weapons. The same thing happened with American friends. Something similar to ideological closeness would appear between them, but in reality this was something that reflected only the personal views of the head of the regime or ruling group, who was attempting to exploit the rivalry between the great powers for his own interests.

So when the USSR and the United States got down to seriously trying to settle regional conflicts, it turned out to be so complex that it was far beyond their possibilities. Basically, there is no way of imposing something on a sovereign state if that state is firmly resolved to resist the pressure.

The latest example of this is Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Having occupied and annexed the country, Iraq nevertheless insisted on no outside interference in its actions. This outrageous violation of peace, international security, the basic norms of international law, and the UN Charter created for the first time in postwar history the situation whereby the USSR and the United States could look on from the sidelines at the shameless behavior of a state calling itself "revolutionary" and realize that the preservation of peace in certain parts of the world was very largely—although not entirely—dependent on them.

The question arose as to what the great powers could do. The UN Security Council strongly condemned the aggressor and passed a resolution on sanctions against Iraq. After that, however, developments began to move at Baghdad's initiative: The threat of further aggression arose, this time against Saudi Arabia, and the United States—having a mutual security treaty with that country—sent its troops there.

The action taken by the USSR and the United States in the first stage of the crisis was united and coordinated, in

accordance with the joint statement of 3 August 1990. This enabled the UN Security Council resolution to be passed quickly. However, Iraq's subsequent action destroyed that coordination to a certain degree.

On one hand, the USSR is bound to Iraq by the 1972 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, which stipulates the need for consultations between the two parties in the event of a threat to peace and security. On the other hand, the action taken by the United States and its allies, who began to move their troops into the region of conflict, led to the danger of an increase in the military conflict, although other means of halting the aggressor could not be found. UN Security Council resolution No. 665 of 25 August 1990 provided for sanctions in accordance with Article 7 of the UN Charter. The international sanctions only served to heighten Baghdad's aggressiveness.

The roots of this defiant behavior lie both in the very nature of the Iraqi regime, and its lack of belief in the changes that are taking place on the world scene. Baghdad evidently believes that the changes in USSR foreign policy, the general warming of the international climate, and the end of the cold war have little effect on the fight for the mineral-rich regions; and that the Soviet Union will sooner or later have to alter its stance—from condemning Iraq to supporting it—if the threat arises of a direct clash between U.S. and Iraqi troops. What we have is something like an inverse dependence by the great powers on the actions of a regional power that tried, by threatening to escalate the conflict, to seize control over it and thereby dictate the corresponding actions to the great powers.

Both Moscow and Washington grasped the meaning behind the Iraqi regime's actions. That is why the USSR and U.S. leaders agreed to hold a special meeting in Helsinki on 9 September 1990 to discuss the state of the Gulf crisis and the possibilities of controlling it. Both powers agreed that the Iraqi aggression against, and annexation of, Kuwait would meet neither with support, nor recognition from them or the international community, and that they would take every possible action in line with the UN Security Council resolutions to make Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait and to restore Kuwait's sovereignty and independence. The Helsinki meeting underscored yet again that the Gulf crisis was not a matter of Iraq confronting the United States, but of the whole world community standing up to Iraq's aggression and attempts to annex a sovereign state by violence.

Consequently, the difference in the situation and interests of the great powers leaves an imprint, of course, on the unilateral action they take, and affects the policy options available regarding regional conflicts. At the same time, the Gulf crisis has shown that the great powers can increase the potential of their common interests when they are faced with a major violation of international law. Obviously, there are limits as to how far the great powers can go in settling crisis situations. Going beyond those limits depends on the good will of

the opposing sides, and if there is no good will, then the prospects of finding a settlement also become extremely dubious. Finally, the stances taken by the great powers themselves are from always identical, since they are affected by internal factors, considerations of prestige, etc.

Efforts made by the great powers to settle conflicts, therefore, can be successful only to a certain extent. What, then, can be done? It was at a meeting in Bologna that a group of U.S. experts headed by John Hopkins University Professor W. Zartman came up with the idea of developing the concept of the limitation or mitigation of conflicts. They suggested discussing this idea with Soviet experts at a meeting in the Bologna Center of the John Hopkins University, and in May 1990 the most varied ideas and concepts of limiting or mitigating conflicts were put forward. This journal has published articles giving perhaps the most interesting points of view that the Soviet reader would find beneficial (Footnote 2) (See "SSha; Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya" 1990, Nos. 11, 12).

What stands out in these documents? First is concern over the state of regional conflicts. They continue to exist and have dangerous potential to escalate. Second, there is the desire to take a broader look at the sources of those conflicts and identify those that could be halted. Great attention is paid, in particular, to the policy of arms supplies. No one can seriously believe that arms supplies are one thing, and the settlement of conflicts something completely different. The example of Iraq has shown that a buildup in its military potential has always led to aggressive urges which have developed into war: the first time when it attacked Iran in 1980, and the second when it attacked Kuwait in August 1990. Third, the desire to find ways and means of limiting conflicts, both geographically (by keeping them from spreading to a wider area) and politically (by preventing them from turning into protracted wars like the civil war in Lebanon) is evident. Various measures are proposed, from cooperation between the great powers to the encouragement of individual efforts to reduce the level of violence, renounce the cruelest and most inhumane types of action (hostage-taking, reprisals against civilians, use of toxic substances, etc.).

The thoughts expressed by the U.S. experts would seem not to contradict in principle the ideas of settlement and resolution of conflicts. They take into account the recent experience of both the great powers when they learned for themselves the difficulty of resolving these issues and essentially agreed that achieving a settlement is a long business and requires many years of effort. The idea of finding the ways and means of limiting the scale of conflicts, mitigating the forms of these conflicts, and switching them from the path of military confrontation to that of political argument and discussion may help create a different, more tolerant climate surrounding them and secure the prerequisites for settling them in the future.

Footnote

1. V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, vol 41, pp 50-62).

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**Superpowers in Regional Conflicts: From
"Korean" to "Kuwait" Pattern**

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IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 90 (signed to
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[Article by Dmitriy Gennadiyevich Yevstafyev, graduate
student at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] The settlement of regional conflicts is one of today's most relevant topics. The growing crisis in Kuwait is one of the main reasons for the heightened interest in this topic. The articles by the three renowned experts on international conflicts were written before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and now we have a unique opportunity to compare the authors' observations and predictions to the actual international situation.

At the beginning of his article, M. Katz stressed that during the period of what he calls the "one-dimensional" patterns of USSR and U.S. behavior, their cooperation in regional conflicts was impossible. Despite the accuracy of this statement, I would like to make a few comments. The "pre-Gorbachev" era was not a single and uniform time period; it consisted of fundamentally different phases, and one of the differences was in the attitude toward crises in the Third World. We could hardly equate the conflict of the superpowers in Korea (1950-1953),¹ when the two sides were effectively waging combat operations against each other, with the Suez crisis (1956), when their positions were similar in several respects; or the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, which presented an example of definite cooperation, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which became one of the factors contributing to the collapse of the policy of detente. The actions of the superpowers were different in all of these cases, ranging from the transfer of regional hostilities to the level of direct interrelations to isolated incidents of concerted action.² We should also take a close look at Katz' statement that the development of conflicts depends on the degree to which USSR and U.S. "intentions" regarding the results of settlement coincide. There is no guarantee that the interests of our countries will coincide in certain cases, and there is nothing unusual about this.

Let us review the history of the superpowers' participation in regional conflicts. Until recently we had witnessed only two basic patterns of behavior. The first and earliest was the "Korean" pattern, in which a regional conflict grew into direct military-political hostilities between the Soviet Union and the United States, with the genuine threat of turning into a "big war." The Korean pattern was most characteristic of the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s. The most vivid examples were the Korean War (which is what gave the pattern its

name) and the Caribbean crisis, essentially the "final performance" of the Korean model. In the second pattern, which could be called "Suez," despite the diverging and sometimes conflicting interests of our countries, the danger that this kind of conflict could grow into a direct confrontation between the superpowers deterred them from transferring the conflict to the level of direct interrelations. This was partly due to the Soviet Union's acquisition of some nuclear potential. This did not mean that a crisis in the Third World could not affect Soviet-American relations as a whole, as was the case when the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. Even then, however, the two sides avoided the excessive aggravation of relations. It was this approach that prevailed in the policies of the two superpowers after the Caribbean missile crisis.

How are these patterns similar and how do they differ? Both were based to some extent on the confrontational approach, and this gave them certain distinctive features. In essence, the fundamental difference between them was that the objective in the "Korean" pattern was victory at any cost, resulting in the choice of the corresponding means and methods of behavior, and the objective in the "Suez" pattern was a less brutal form of confrontation because the price of "victory" had risen too high by the middle of the 1950s. The unpublicized choice of the "Suez" pattern effectively signified a voluntary Soviet and U.S. renunciation of direct armed confrontation on the regional level, which removed the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons from the superpowers' arsenals and put some limits on the possible escalation of regional crises. The confrontational essence of both approaches did not change, however, and the isolated concerted actions mentioned above were viewed as one form of antagonism.

Are these patterns of behavior admissible today? Certainly not. They cannot influence the present policy or, what is most important, the future policy of the superpowers in regional conflicts, if only because the confrontational approach lying at their basis is outdated and obsolete. This is not simply a result of the changes in the Soviet Union's policy and the substitution of the "new thinking" for confrontation, although this is extremely important. The main reason is that it will be impossible to build a new, non-violent world based on the principles of equality if the clashes between the superpowers in the developing world continue in any form whatsoever. To keep the Third World from becoming an obstacle, metaphorically speaking, on the road to this development, **all of the developed states will have to coordinate a common policy on regional conflicts.**

This article is being written at a time when the crisis in the Persian Gulf is reaching its peak. The results are still unknown, but one thing is important: The superpowers have taken the same position (despite all reservations) for the first time. In the past, as I have already said, there were isolated cases of coordinated efforts or at least similar or parallel actions, but they were dictated largely by purely pragmatic considerations and did not diverge from the confrontational pattern. Today, however, the

coordinated actions in the Persian Gulf are dictated by fundamental policy instead of by pragmatic considerations. We might be witnessing the elaboration of a new pattern of superpower behavior, which could be called the "Kuwait" pattern. Let us take a look at the articles from this standpoint.

The experience of France is used in E. Kolodziej's article to illustrate the acceptability of, and even the need for, military intervention in the affairs of developing countries, which is probably the most controversial issue discussed in all three works. On the one hand, many of these countries, including the potential objects of these actions, have modern weapons of their own, making the "surgical operations" Kolodziej mentions virtually impossible. Military intervention could result in the major escalation of a conflict, which, in some regions (the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and others), would inevitably affect the security as well as the interests of the developed states themselves. For this reason, the future of the purely military method of resolving conflicts in the Third World looks quite dubious in view of the American experience and our own sad experience. On the other hand, it will probably be important to decide how the superpowers might become involved in the internal affairs of other states without taking the risk of turning into "world policemen." There is no question that the "liberation of people from inhumane leaders" is an important and noble cause, but who will decide the level of humanization of the state and make the decision to intervene? Would the implementation of this idea not mark the beginning of a new Holy Alliance? This could be extremely dangerous for all of the countries of the world.

Military methods of participation in regional conflicts should not be rejected outright, however, because they could be necessary in some situations. They could be necessary in enforcing UN Security Council resolutions, for example, like those adopted in connection with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. The mechanism for making such decisions, however, should be carefully planned. They probably should not be made only as a result of a consensus by the superpowers. The entire world community should take part in the process. A system of UN-based collective military-political security, with international armed forces, could be an important step in this direction. The further development of the armed forces of regional organizations, such as the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, and others, would also be possible.

The process of regional conflict resolution should not be confined only to the efforts of developed states and meet only their interests. There is no need to be wary of the broad-scale internationalization of conflict resolution. A resolution process viewed as a "division of the world" or intervention by the superpowers would probably have a more ruinous effect on the international situation. Actions involving regional organizations and the United Nations seem more productive. Nevertheless, we cannot

exclude the possibility of individual action by separate states with "special" relationships with states in the region.

The authors of all of the articles have the same question: "What kind of forms should superpower participation in reducing and resolving regional conflicts take?" Before we answer this question, we must decide the specific cases in which superpower involvement can have positive results. This will probably require the categorization of the basic types of conflicts in the Third World today.

When we use the term "conflict," we are referring to a broad range of situations, from political confrontations to military-political hostilities transcending the boundaries of the classic definition of the conflict and corresponding more to the term "war." In general, the categorization of conflicts and conflict situations (in the political and the purely military sense) has not been overlooked by scholars. It is the topic of many works by renowned Soviet and foreign experts on international conflicts.³ There are various ways of categorizing conflict situations, and we must remember that standardization is probably impossible in this area. In the United States, for example, the most common method in recent years has been the categorization of conflicts in terms of their intensity.⁴

In this case, we are more interested in a possible system for the categorization of conflicts in terms of superpower participation. It would probably have the following appearance.

First of all, there are conflicts representing a direct result of confrontations between the superpowers on the global or regional level. The start of these conflicts can be largely due to the actions of one superpower either to conquer new positions in the Third World or to maintain the status quo. For this reason, I cannot agree with I. Malashenko, who wrote that "in terms of scale and the goals and objectives of the sides, the cold war was a struggle by the United States and its allies to change the postwar geopolitical balance in their own favor."⁵ The cold war years were also a period of struggle by the USSR to change the postwar situation in its favor, and this is what led to conflicts of the described type. They could be called "geopolitical." In these conflicts, the confrontation between the superpowers is quite intense, but it usually does not go beyond indirect participation, because the risk of turning the regional clash into a global one far outweighs the possible dividends. The hostilities between the USSR and the United States in Korea were an exception to this rule in some respects and were distinguished by direct participation by both superpowers. Conflicts of this type often arise as a result of the attempts of one superpower to change the balance radically in its own favor or as a result of a mistaken assessment of the opponent's intentions, as in the Suez crisis of 1956.

Second, there are conflicts resulting from abrupt changes in the policy of one state due to internal factors. To a

considerable extent, they cannot be viewed as a direct result of superpower confrontation. In these cases, however, one superpower sees the situation as a way of gaining advantages and becomes a participant in the conflict. In conflicts of this type, only the interests and position of one side are threatened at the outset. In principle, the situation in Nicaragua could be assigned to this category. Participation by one of the superpowers in this case forces the other to take more vigorous action, and this only stimulates the spread of the conflict. These conflicts could be called "unilateral."

Third, there are conflicts which are only partially due to superpower confrontation but affect the interests of one or both superpowers. Territorial, political, or other disputes of a local or regional nature usually lie at the basis of these conflicts. The Iraq-Iran war and Iraq's annexation of Kuwait are examples of this. Superpower participation in these conflicts is mainly indirect. It primarily includes shipments of arms (sometimes to both sides), shows of strength, diplomatic actions, etc. These could probably be called "intra-regional," even though their effects can go far beyond regional boundaries. The term "intra-regional" underscores the fact that the main causes giving rise to the conflict are inside the region rather than outside.

Finally, the fourth group are conflicts of varying intensity with absolutely no connection with confrontation between the superpowers and no direct effect on their interests. These situations are usually a result of internal hostilities in distant countries. They could be called "internal." The situations in Liberia, some other African countries, and Sri Lanka are examples.

If we analyze the conflicts of the first two types, we see that they can be domestic (virtually staying within a single state) or foreign (affecting intergovernmental relations) policy actions. There is no question that the foreign policy conflicts, essentially international conflicts, are more dangerous because they have a tendency to grow, and sometimes uncontrollably.

If we wish to stay within the realm of realistic thinking, we must admit that the superpowers cannot (with the exception of extremely rare and specific cases of unprovoked intervention) generate regional conflicts arising for socioeconomic, religious, and other reasons of an internal nature. They can, however, promote or prevent their growth. After we have acknowledged this, we should probably also agree that they cannot resolve these conflicts unilaterally, but can only promote or prevent resolution.⁶

Consequently, there is every reason to say that the normalization of the situation in most parts of the world is mainly a job for the leaders of regional forces.

It is more convenient for the superpowers to extinguish a conflict at the lowest level of intensity. In accordance with this, the primary objective could be the prevention of the growth of socioeconomic, religious, ethnic, or political friction into an armed confrontation. In the

initial phase this problem could be solved successfully without the direct use of military-political means and at a minimum cost.

It is no secret that efforts to resolve regional conflicts have usually represented a struggle against the effects, rather than the causes, of the contradictions lying at their basis, and this is why these measures are comparatively ineffective. We must admit, however, that, first of all, regional conflicts are not always treatable by "preventive care"; second, that their causes are not always socioeconomic (this opinion, strongly redolent of economic determinism, was once quite common, especially in our country); third, that participation by the USSR and the United States, even in the presence of completely coordinated action and the absence of intentions to hurt the other side, does not always produce positive results. Of course, superpowers probably have the greatest chance of influencing the situation in "geopolitical" conflicts. The resolution of these is connected largely with their actions, because the "big two" control strong levers to influence the situation. In this case, the overall improvement of relations between the USSR and the United States will obviously have a positive impact. One of the most promising recipes suggested by the authors of these articles is the **non-resentment of the other superpower's position and the refusal to undermine it**. This can and should lead to actions, one of which could be **the refusal to give military and financial support to antigovernmental movements, regardless of their character and ideological aims**.

It must be said that the superpowers also have considerable potential in conflicts categorized as "unilateral." The idea of elaborating some kind of "code of behavior" in regional conflicts, based on the philosophical premises of the theories of non-offensive defense and mutual damage avoidance, and of assigning the appropriate political significance to this code, warrants consideration. No long ago, this idea might have sounded absurd, although it was suggested in the United States back in the first years of American-Soviet detente. Because of the prevailing confrontational patterns of policy on the regional and global levels, however, the idea was buried, and the relations between the superpowers in matters of policy in the Third World continued to represent "a game without any rules."⁷ Today, now that the Soviet Union and United States trust each other more, an attempt should be made to develop new forms of interaction, taking the very best from past experience.

Apparently, the most difficult conflicts to resolve will be the "intra-regional" ones. Because these conflicts will be so far removed from superpower interrelations, they will inevitably create the kind of contradictory situation combining the simplest route to agreement by the superpowers with the most difficult course of their effective influence on the development of the situation.

As for the conflicts we have called "internal," in this case concerted efforts by the superpowers have a chance of

success by virtue of their authority and presumed objectivity, because, as S. Larrabee, the renowned expert of USSR-U.S. relations in the Third World, wrote, "it is easier for the two superpowers to cooperate in the resolution of regional conflicts when their interests and prestige are not affected directly."⁸ Obviously, the chances will be even greater if international organizations are also involved in the settlement process. It is possible that the best form of USSR-U.S. action could be mediation between the conflicting parties. As far as participation by the armed forces of our countries is concerned, this probably should be confined to their participation as part of the UN peacekeeping contingent, although the armed forces of regional organizations seem more suitable in many cases, especially if the conflict is confined to a specific region. Methods of behavior should also be chosen in accordance with the nature and type of conflict. In this process, it would be wise to remember that the effectiveness of military intervention (even for the purpose of resolution) in regional hostilities is already negligible, and even if this approach is possible, it will entail substantial sacrifices, not to mention material expenditures. It is also doubtful whether it would be wise for our country to take part in such actions in its present state.

Charles Doran's view of the situation seems too optimistic when he speaks of the mechanism of USSR-U.S. influence in conflicts like the Iraq-Iran war. Recent events in the Persian Gulf have provided a vivid illustration of the limited potential of actions by the superpowers. Neither the "big two" nor any other country had any effective mechanisms to prevent the escalation of the crisis. The concentration of the armies and navies of various countries in the Persian Gulf will probably serve only as a factor of psychological pressure, because no country, with the exception of the United States, has any precise military-political theory or, what is most important, potential for action in Third World countries. The potential of such countries as Great Britain and France (military and political) is, on the one hand, far inferior to the American potential and, on the other, intended for use in conflicts of much more modest scales and intensity.⁹

There are also some doubts about the feasibility of linking conflict resolution with "spheres of influence." After all, this concept has changed so much since the time of its birth (at the turn of the century) that it would be extremely difficult today to determine: 1) the degree and forms of dependence on the superpowers within the sphere; 2) the mechanism of superpower influence on dependent states; and 3) the degree of foreign policy freedom of the countries within the sphere. If we leave the theoretical level, we could probably question the very existence of a Soviet sphere of influence. Even the United States is far from omnipotent in its extant sphere.

Doran mentions one of the main features of the development of the present situation in the Third World in passing. Whereas the main danger of conflict situations

in these regions was once the possibility of the deterioration of relations between our countries, and sometimes quite substantially due to differences of opinion on regional matters, now the situation in Third World countries could pose a direct threat to the interests of the superpowers themselves, and in some cases even to their security. Furthermore, the threat is not necessarily connected with the actions of the other superpower. For the Soviet Union the threat is particularly acute, because the southern borders of our country are directly adjacent to several unstable or potentially unstable regions.

This completely new, or previously unacknowledged, situation requires serious investigation, because it should determine the principles of relations with Third World countries and behavior in regional conflicts. In connection with this, it is extremely promising that the crisis in the Persian Gulf is marked by a consensus on the part of the largest states, which just recently would have seemed utopian.

Another important matter is the issue of the local arms races. The continuation of these contributes a great deal to regional conflicts. The superpowers must realize, from the example of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait if nothing else, that massive arms shipments to some of the "hottest" regions for the purpose of countering some kind of threat, and sometimes even to derive immediate benefits, could be counterproductive over the long range. The arms trade, however, raises some difficult questions. If both of our countries and the other developed states stop shipping arms to their allies, for example, the military balance in some regions might be tipped in favor of one side because of its more highly developed military industry. These balances are still the only effective means of maintaining the stability of regional systems. This could stop cooperation between the superpowers and could lead to a new round of the arms race. This is already a completely real danger in the Near and Middle East.

Ironically, the very fact that most weapons are bought from the superpowers makes regional arms races predictable and controllable to some extent. Today, however, any regional power can easily find other sellers of virtually any type of weapon, from tanks to ballistic missiles. For this reason, it would be wrong to exaggerate the role of this factor.

Another important aspect of the problem is the determination of the kind of conflicts in which our country can and should become directly involved. The authors of the articles focus attention on the need for a symmetrical approach to participation in regional conflict resolution, but Soviet participation in this process should not be a goal in itself. After all, the degree of interest in conflict resolution depends largely on the degree to which the interests of a superpower are affected. It is no secret that there are serious differences in the structure and content of U.S. and USSR interests in the Third World. For this

reason, it is probably impossible to demand that our countries take an equal interest in the resolution of these conflicts.

In the near future, the Soviet Union will have to reassess the entire system of its ally relations with developing countries, especially its organizing principles. In its present form it represents a product of the cold war and the confrontational approach. Now that we are trying to get rid of earlier stereotypes, we will have to reassess our relations with some Third World countries with a view to new realities. This certainly does not mean that we should sever all ties with our earlier friends and allies. On the contrary, we should continue mutually beneficial cooperation, including cooperation in the military-political sphere. We will have to reconsider our relations with the dictatorships and totalitarian regimes that still constitute a high percentage of our friends. As the first step, we could publish the full texts of our international and intergovernmental agreements, to make public our obligations to our partners, which are virtually unknown today.

Regional cooperation by the superpowers is a virtually inexhaustible topic, and it is impossible to examine many serious issues even within the framework of a discussion of this length, but the guiding principle of investigations in this area should be the realization that neither isolationism nor globalism can serve as a panacea. The basis of our country's policy—and making this policy is one of the chief functions of Soviet experts on international conflicts—should be moderation and pragmatism, backed up impartial scientific analyses of our real interests and capabilities. It is probably time to begin working on a theory of national security, and we can only hope that this discussion will be of some help in the elaboration of its regional aspects.

Footnotes

1. On the surface, the Korean War appears to be a conflict between the United States and the DPRK, with limited participation by China, but this is far from true. The new data recently made public indicate substantial involvement by the USSR and PRC. For a more detailed discussion, see: "Khrushchev Remembers," translated and edited by S. Talbott, Boston, 1970, pp 367-373; M. Hastings, "The Korean War," Washington, 1987.

2. The following work is extremely interesting in this context: R. Garthoff, "Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan," Washington, 1985.

3. See, for example, "Mezhdunarodnyye konflikty" [International Conflicts], edited by V.V. Zhurkin and Ye.M. Primakov, Moscow, 1972; V.V. Zhurkin, "SShA i mezhdunarodno-politicheskiye krizisy" [The United States and International Political Crises], Moscow, 1975; "Mezhdunarodnyye konflikty sovremennosti" [Contemporary International Conflicts], edited by V.I. Gantman, Moscow, 1983.

4. This has apparently become the official method because it is the one used in field manuals. See, for example, "U.S. Army, Low-Intensity Conflict," Field Manual, U.S. Army FM 100-20, January 1981.

5. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1990, No 6, p 57.

6. It will be necessary to resolutely discard the theory of the "imperialist" or, conversely, "communist conspiracy" that is so common, even in the academic community. These two concepts were virtual mirror images. One blamed the start of regional conflicts on the activities of world imperialism, and the other blamed world communism. See, for example, "Gosudarstva NATO i voyennyye konflikty" [The NATO States and Military Conflicts], Moscow, 1987; "Revolutsionnyye dvizheniya i imperialisticheskaya kontrevolyutsiya (70-ye—nachalo 80-kh godov)" [Revolutionary Movements and Imperialist Counterrevolution (1970s-early 1980s)], Moscow, 1987. The most interesting of the latest works by the fans of the theory of the "communist conspiracy" is an article by R. Parshall ("Marxist Counterinsurgencies," PARAMETERS, 1986, No 2). Also see R. Nixon, "1999. Victory Without War," New York, 1988.

7. Larrabee's comments in the article "Lessons for the USSR and the United States in the Third World" (MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1990, No 5) are extremely interesting.

8. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1990, No 5, p 31.

9. This was demonstrated by their use by France in Chad, the Central African Republic, and other countries of French-speaking Africa, and by England's use of them in Oman.

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